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Immigrant assimilationWe estimate the impact of the income earned in the host country on return migration of labor migrants from
developing countries. We use a three-state correlated competing risks model to account for the strong depen-
dence of labor market status and the income earned. Our analysis is based on administrative panel data of recent
labor immigrants from developing countries to The Netherlands. The empirical results show that intensities of
return migration are U-shaped with respect to migrants' income, implying a higher intensity in low- and high-
income groups. Indeed, the lowest-income group has the highest probability of return.We also ﬁnd that ignoring
the interdependence of labor market status and the income earned leads to an overestimating the income effect
on departure.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The literature on international migration is large and growing, but
only recently attention has been paid to temporary migration as many
migrants, in fact, return. The limited theoretical literature on return
migration provides several explanations for why migrants return. On
the one hand, return migration is seen as planned and part of optimal
decision making to maximize total utility over the whole life cycle
where return migration is motivated by locational preference for home
country, e.g. consumption or differences in relative prices in host and
home country (e.g. Dustmann, 1997; Galor and Stark, 1991). Thus,
migrants migrate temporarily to accumulate resources or skills, for
later use in the home country. On the other hand, another strand ofprogramme on Migration in
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ights reserved.this emerging literature sees return migration as unplanned and the re-
sult of failure either due to imperfect information about the host country
in terms of labor market prospects or the cost of living, or the inability to
fulﬁll the migration plans in terms of target savings (see Borjas and
Bratsberg, 1996).
An interesting issue that has been understudied is the relation-
ship between the migration duration and migrant's income abroad.
Although there is a consensus that migration is driven by the wage
differential between the host and the home country, the effect of
wages (or income) on return migration is ambiguous. Migrants would,
on the onehand, like to extend their stay overseas as a response to higher
wages; on the other hand, the gain from staying longer abroad decreases.
As a consequence, higherwages abroadmayhave a positive or a negative
effect on migration duration.
This paper contributes to this literature by using unique data that
circumvent several data problems encountered in previous studies.
We use administrative data from The Netherlands, where we observe
all immigrants who have entered the country between 1999 and
2007, and their motive for migration: whether for labor migration or
otherwise, the timing of return and the exact detailed information
on their labor market status and income. This enables us to address
our question of interest on the effect of income on migration duration
in a novel way that takes into account the changing nature of income
experienced by migrants, and control for the correlation between the
potential endogenous labor market status of themigrant and the return
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different origins and the corresponding variation in the immigration
policies that impact on the free movement of immigrants and hence
their return migration, we limit our focus to labor immigrants from
less developed countries (LDC).
The empirical evidence on the effect of incomeonmigrant's duration
abroad is rather limited due to lack of data and is mixed. For example,
Borjas (1989) ﬁnds among the foreign-born in the United States that
higher earnings are associated with less return migration. By contrast,
Dustmann (2003) shows that immigrants in Germany return earlier
when the wage level in the host country increases, whilst Nekby
(2006) ﬁnds a U relation between income and out-migration. However,
Constant andMassey (2003) ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant relationship
between earnings and migrant returns in Germany, although migrants
who are unemployed are more likely to return. Furthermore, Gibson
andMcKenzie (2011)who successfully tracked down a high proportion
of the very top performers in secondary school from 1976 to 2004
from three Paciﬁc countries, ﬁnd that narrow measures of income
gains play a very minor role in determining which of the highly skilled
return.
These previous papers relied on longitudinal data that suffer
from high attrition rates and lack information on the exact timing
of the migration moves and only reveal whether the migrant is still
in the country at the interview date. We use data from Statistics
Netherlands, which includes data on a monthly basis, the labor market
status and income of the migrants. The timing of both labor market
status changes and migration status changes allows us to construct
the full labor market and migration history. The duration in each labor
market state forms the basis of our analysis. Duration, or event history,
models have been used extensively for demographic analysis but are
rather limited in migration studies and analysis of return migration is
even scarcer.
In this paper we investigate whether it is the high-income or
low-income migrants who leave faster. We examine the extent to
which the length of migration stay of migrants differs with regard
to their initial income level in the host country. To account for the
strong dependence between labor market status and income earned,
we distinguish between three labor market statuses: employed, unem-
ployed and non-participation and estimate a three-state correlated
competing risksmodel.We control for unobserved correlated heteroge-
neity in the labor market and income earned at the host country, and
migration processes. Given the diversity of immigrants' background,
we limit the analysis to labor immigrants from developing countries
since the behavior of those immigrants is paramount for policymakers.
We also control for home country circumstances by using time varying
GDP per capita and economic growth.
This analysis has a number of interesting and important implications
for migration policies. Who leaves faster? Is it the ‘successful’migrants
or the ‘unsuccessful’ ones?Our empirical results show that return inten-
sities are U-shaped with respect to income, implying a higher intensity
in low- and high- income groups. Indeed, the ﬁndings suggest that the
low-income group has the highest intensity of return. This U shape is
found at differentmigration durations, although the intensities of return
decline after 5–6 years in The Netherlands. Once controlling for endog-
enous income, the effect of income on return intensities for the highest
earners is not as strong as in the case of exogenous income. Suggesting
that for these migrants income growth in the host country is strongly
related to (unobserved) factors also affecting departure. In particular,
the high earners might have a higher risk attitude leading to more
wage growth and higher mobility. Interestingly, our simulations com-
paring immigrants from themain ﬁve less developed countries of origin
(India, China, Turkey, South Africa and Morocco) ﬁnd consistent evi-
dence of this U-shaped relationship between initial income and return,
with the lowest-income group having the highest intensity, followed by
the high income groups. This is consistent with having successful high-
incomemigrants leaving once they have earned their savings or humancapital accumulation targets, whilst at the same time, the low-income
migrants returning as a result of their limited success. These ﬁndings
provide evidence of brain circulation as we ﬁnd high earners having
shorter migration duration, and also ﬁnding low-income immigrants
leaving quickly dampens the concern by many about the ﬁscal burden
of low income immigrants. Finally, our results highlight that ignoring
the interdependence of labor market status and in particular income
earned leads to overestimation of the impact of income.
The outline of the paper is as follows.We consider brieﬂy the related
literature and conceptual framework next. In Section 3, we present
the data and discuss brieﬂy recent migration to The Netherlands.
In Section 4 we present the results of estimating a simple standard
duration model that ignores the possible endogeneity of the labor
market status and the income earned. Section 5 spells out the correlated
competing risks model (CCRM) which takes this endogeneity into
account. Section 6 considers the comparison of important labor market
indicators by income status using microsimulation based on the esti-
mated CCRM. Section 7 focuses on the implications for the main coun-
tries of origin. The last section concludes.
2. Related literature and conceptual framework
Much of the economic research considers migration as permanent
(see e.g. Borjas, 1999; Chiswick, 1978;Massey et al., 1993). Nevertheless,
the level of return migration has been high both in the US and Europe.
Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) report that of the 1971 cohort of immi-
grants to the US, almost ﬁfty percent returned by 1979. Dustmann
(1995) has demonstrated the relevance of return migration in the
European context. In The Netherlands, recent migrants also show a
high return rate (see Bijwaard, 2010).
Several competing theories have been advanced to explain the
impact of the income level of migrants in the host country on their
propensity to return. According to one strand of literature, returnmigra-
tion is planned and part of an optimal strategy to maximize life-time
utility characterized by a preference for source country consumption
(see e.g. Dustmann, 1997, 2003; Dustmann and Weiss, 2007; Galor
and Stark, 1991). Return migration by target savers is but one example.
Thus,migrants are viewed as target earnerswho return home after their
target is reached andhence high incomemigrantswould return faster. A
fundamentally different mechanism is based on mistaken expectations
about, and immediate failure on the host country's labormarket, leading
to an ‘unplanned’ return (Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996). According to this
view, return migrants are “failures” and low incomemigrants are more
prone to return faster.
Empirical work focusing on the effect of migrant income on the
return decision is rather limited. Borjas (1989) using longitudinal
data from the 1972–1978 Survey of Natural and Social Scientists and
Engineers, ﬁnds among the foreign-born in the US that higher earnings
are associated with less return migration. Yang (2006) too ﬁnds similar
qualitative results exploiting a unique quasi-experiment to distinguish
between these potential explanations for return migration. He exam-
ines how the return decisions of the Philippine migrants respond to
major and unexpected exchange rate shocks (due to the 1997 Asian
ﬁnancial crisis). He ﬁnds that more favorable exchange rate shocks
which can be interpreted as higher income lead to fewer migrant
returns. Contrary to that, Dustmann (2003) analyzes optimal migration
durations in a model, which rationalizes the decision of the migrant to
return to his home country, despite persistently higher wages in the
host country. He shows that, if migrations are temporary, the optimal
migration duration may decrease if the wages increase based on a
panel of immigrants to Germany over a 14-year period. Nekby (2006),
using data on registered emigration from Sweden from 1991 to 2000,
ﬁnds that although emigrants in general have higher adjusted mean
income levels, up to the age of 35–40, than non-emigrants, onward
migrants have lower predicted income levels across the age distribution
due to this groups relatively low employment levels in Sweden.
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Constant andMassey (2003) ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant relationship
between earnings and migrant returns in Germany, although migrants
who are unemployed are more likely to return. Gibson and McKenzie
(2011) successfully tracked down a high proportion of the very top
performers in secondary school over 1976 to 2004 from three Paciﬁc
countries. The results reveal for both the initial decision to emigrate
and the decision to return, income gains play a veryminor role in deter-
mining which of the highly skilled migrate and return, whereas prefer-
ence variables are strong predictors. None of those previous studies
adopt a structural approach and use competing risks model.
Closer to our interest is Bijwaard (2009) and Bijwaard et al.
(forthcoming). Bijwaard (2009) considers the correlation between
migration decisions and labor market status transitions. Bijwaard et al.
(forthcoming) estimate the causal effect of unemployment on the
return decision in The Netherlands. Neither of the studies examines
the effect of migrants' income on migration duration and the intensity
of return.3. Administrative panel data on the population of immigrants to
The Netherlands
All legal immigration by non-Dutch citizens to The Netherlands
is registered in the Central Register Foreigners (Centraal Register
Vreemdelingen, CRV), using information from the Immigration Police
(Vreemdelingen Politie) and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (Immigratie en Naturalisatie Dienst, IND). It is mandatory for
every immigrant to notify the local population register immediately
on arrival in The Netherlands if he or she intends to stay for at least
two-thirds of the forthcoming six months. The data comprise the entire
population of immigrants who entered during our observation window
of 1999–2007, and after merging in other administrative registers we
obtain a panel.
In addition to the date of entry and exit, the administration also
records the migration motive of the individual. Either the motive is
coded according to the visa status of the immigrant, or the immigrant
reports the motive on registration in the population register. Statistics
Netherlands distinguishes among the following motives: labor-
migrants, family migrants, student immigrants, asylum seekers (and
refugees), and immigrants for other reasons. See Bijwaard (2010) for
an extensive descriptive analysis of the various migration motives. In
particular, about 23% of all non-Dutch immigrants in the age group
18–64 are labor migrants. Given our interest in the effect of migrant
income on return, we focus exclusively on labor migrants and restrict
our analysis to those immigrants who are employed in The Netherlands
within three months of their entry. Non-labor migrants have different
motives formigrating, such as family or study. Hence the effect of income
on their return is different. Furthermore, given the substantial heteroge-
neity between immigrants from different origins and the corresponding
variation in the immigration policies that impact on the free movementTable 1
Descriptive statistics at entry, LDC labor migrants.
Initial income: from low to high
Inc 1 Inc 2 Inc 3
Female 28.1% 22.5% 23.3%
Single 79.4% 76.2% 72.2%
Married 18.9% 22.5% 26.5%
Av. age 30.3 30.4 31.0
GDP per capita. $2976 $3544 $4051
GDP growth 5.2% 5.8% 6.0%
Distribution of income 32.3% 23.0% 17.5%
Inc 1:Monthly income b €1000; Inc 2:Monthly income €1000–€2000; Inc 3:Monthly income €
Inc 6: Monthly income €5000–€6000; Inc 7: Monthly income N €6000.of immigrants and hence their return migration, we limit our focus to
labor immigrants from less developed countries (LDC).
Although, in principle, the exact date of emigration is known, some
migrants do not ofﬁcially inform the authorities when they leave.
The departure of these non-complying individuals is registered as
an‘administrative removal’ after the authorities have assessed that the
migrant has left the municipality without showing up in the ﬁles of
another municipality in The Netherlands or as an emigrant. These
administrative removals are included among emigration and they add
up to about 38% of all emigrations and 73% of these administrative
removedmigrants have no observed income in the country.We conjec-
ture that the majority of these migrants have left the country shortly
after they stopped receiving income (either earnings or beneﬁts). For
those who still have income until they are administratively removed
we assume that they left at that exact date. For those who are both
administrative removed and have “zero income at last observed time”,
we assume that the migrant has left before the date the administrative
removal is recorded and after the last date of any observed change
in the observed characteristics (e.g. labor market status, housing and
marital status). Such limited information is equivalent to interval-
censored data. For interval-censored data the exact end of duration is
unknown, but it is known that the duration ended in some time period.
Wehave explicitly addressed the issue of administrative removals in the
formulation of the likelihoods below.
The immigration register is linked by Statistics Netherlands to the
Municipal Register of Population (Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie,
GBA) and to their Social Statistical Database (SSD). The GBA contains
basic demographic characteristics of the migrants, such as age, gender,
marital status and country of origin. From the SSDwe have information
(on a monthly basis) on the labor market status, income, industry
sector, housing and household situation. To capture, country of origin's
economic situation, we use annual GDP per capita and GDP growth
rate by country of origin from the World Bank, World Development
Indicators. To control for the host country's labor market, national un-
employment rates are used.We also control for the potential immigrant
cohort effects, by using the unemployment rate in The Netherlands at
the time of immigration. We distinguish three labor market categories:
(1) employed and self-employed, (2) unemployed but receiving bene-
ﬁts and (3) non-participating (which includes those unemployed who
are illegible for any beneﬁts and those with no income). Note that LDC
immigrants entering during our observation window do not qualify
for social beneﬁts straight away, as eligibility requires sufﬁciently long
employment or residence durations.3.1. Descriptive statistics
First, we provide an overview of our data. Table 1 shows various
migrant characteristics by initial income group of our sample of
16,974 labor immigrants from LDCs. Almost 77% are men and they are
most often single (71%). The immigrants are relatively young, withInc 4 Inc 5 Inc 6 Inc 7
21.5% 19.2% 19.9% 15.5%
67.7% 65.8% 53.9% 45.9%
31.9% 33.5% 43.4% 53.1%
31.6 32.5 34.8 36.9
$4406 $4791 $5943 $5483
6.2% 6.0% 5.2% 5.2%
9.8% 5.1% 3.0% 9.4%
2000–€3000; Inc 4:Monthly income €3000–€4000; Inc 5:Monthly income €4000–€5000;
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Fig. 1. Kaplan–Meier estimates of probability to stay in NL, by income group.
57G.E. Bijwaard, J. Wahba / Journal of Development Economics 108 (2014) 54–6816% younger than 25 and 48% younger than 30. The main countries
of origin of our LDC labor immigrants are: India (19%), China (10%),
South Africa (8%), Brazil (4%), Taiwan (4%) and Morocco (3%). Themonths since first entry
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Fig. 2. Non-parametric survival rate anaverage income of the migrants at the time of arrival is €2751, with
32% earning €1000 or less monthly and another 23% earning only
between €1000 and €2000 a month. The average GDP per capita in
the home country is $3151 and the average growth rate of the country
of origin is 4.8%. Interestingly, the proportion of women is the highest
in the lowest-income group. Moreover, low earners are more likely to
be single and younger compared with the high earners. Indeed, there
seems to be a correlation between the GDP per capita of a country of
origin and the migrant income group.
The unconditional distribution of the immigration duration (Fig. 1)
depicts the Kaplan–Meier estimates of the survival probabilities by
income immigrant group. All groups have similar survival probabilities.
However, the top earners (more than €6000) show the highest survival
rate up to 24 months, then at longer durations they have the lowest
staying incidence. The bottom income immigrant group tends to have
the highest exit rate in the ﬁrst 2–3 years but later they become the
least likely to leave.
Fig. 2 shows the Kaplan–Meier estimates of the survival probabili-
ties, from employment, and the cumulative incidence functions by
labor market status and income immigrant group. Those estimates
show that the survival in employment is the lowest over time for the
lowest earner groups. They move more often to non-participation and
unemployment. But migrants with a higher initial income leave the
country sooner. However, thoseﬁgures donot take into account the cor-
relation between the labor market status, the change in earned income
and migration duration.pe
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Table 2
Estimation results simple (M) PH model (with correction for administrative removal).
PH MPH
Female −0.236⁎⁎⁎ (0.030) −0.291⁎⁎⁎ (0.033)
Married −0.089⁎⁎⁎ (0.027) −0.135⁎⁎⁎ (0.031)
Divorced −0.409⁎⁎⁎ (0.108) −0.458⁎⁎⁎ (0.116)
# of children −0.268⁎⁎⁎ (0.012) −0.287⁎⁎⁎ (0.011)
On beneﬁt (unemployed) −0.027 (0.104) 0.002 (0.102)
Non-participation 1.583⁎⁎⁎ (0.045) 1.715⁎⁎⁎ (0.048)
Self-employed −2.455⁎⁎⁎ (0.287) −2.488⁎⁎⁎ (0.273)
Income b 1000 0.797⁎⁎⁎ (0.066) 0.857⁎⁎⁎ (0.066)
Income 1000–2000 −0.215⁎⁎⁎ (0.052) −0.193⁎⁎⁎ (0.052)
Income 3000–4000 0.241⁎⁎⁎ (0.055) 0.244⁎⁎⁎ (0.056)
Income 4000–5000 0.383⁎⁎⁎ (0.068) 0.388⁎⁎⁎ (0.069)
Income 5000–6000 0.420⁎⁎⁎ (0.082) 0.430⁎⁎⁎ (0.084)
Income N 6000 0.600⁎⁎⁎ (0.055) 0.611⁎⁎⁎ (0.057)
Repeated employment −0.812⁎⁎⁎ (0.046) −0.945⁎⁎⁎ (0.055)
Unemployed before −0.204⁎⁎ (0.095) −0.265⁎⁎ (0.107)
NP before 0.341⁎⁎⁎ (0.056) 0.378⁎⁎⁎ (0.062)
ln (GDPPC) −0.086⁎⁎⁎ (0.011) −0.093⁎⁎⁎ (0.012)
GDP growth 0.022⁎⁎⁎ (0.003) 0.023⁎⁎⁎ (0.003)
National Unemp. rate 0.027⁎⁎ (0.014) 0.016 (0.015)
Unemp. rate at entry −0.327⁎⁎⁎ (0.047) −0.347⁎⁎⁎ (0.050)
α2 (3–6 months) 1.215⁎⁎⁎ (0.112) 1.230⁎⁎⁎ (0.114)
α3 (6–12 months) 2.117⁎⁎⁎ (0.099) 2.159⁎⁎⁎ (0.106)
α4 (12–24 months) 2.455⁎⁎⁎ (0.098) 2.552⁎⁎⁎ (0.108)
α5 (24–36 months) 2.502⁎⁎⁎ (0.100) 2.654⁎⁎⁎ (0.112)
α6 (36–60 months) 2.485⁎⁎⁎ (0.100) 2.721⁎⁎⁎ (0.115)
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We rely on duration analysis in our estimation of return migration
for several reasons. First, duration analysis focuses on the timing of
the return decision and not just on whether it occurred. A duration
model takes into account such a change in the intensity to leave. Second,
along with the migration decisions, other relevant characteristics of the
individuals may also change over time, such as the labor market sta-
tus and migrant's income. Duration models allow us to include such
time-varying covariates. Third, it is hardly ever possible to observe
migration decisions over thewhole life time of amigrant. The knowl-
edge that the immigrant has been in the host country from his entry
time up till the end, however, contains valuable information, and du-
ration models allow for such right censoring as well as left
truncation.
We assume that the conditional hazard follows a mixed propor-
tional hazard model, given by products of baseline hazards (measuring
duration dependence) and functions of observed time-varying
characteristics x and unobserved characteristics v:
θ tjx tð Þvð Þ ¼ vλ0 tð Þ exp x tð Þβð Þ ð1Þ
where λ0(t) represents the baseline intensity, that is, the duration
dependence of the intensity common to all individuals.
If a migrant is administratively removed at duration ta and the last
observed change for this migrant occurred at duration t1 b ta, the contri-
bution to the likelihood (of the out-migration) of this migrant is the
probability of survival till t1 times the probability that the migrant left
the country between t1 and ta. The latter is equal to the survival from
t1 until ta given survival.
Let ai indicate whether the emigration of migrant i was due to an
administrative removal (ai = 1). For an administratively removed
migrant we introduce two different event dates: tia is the administrative
removal date and ti1 b tia is the date of the last recorded change in any of
the characteristics of migrant i before tia.
We have data for i = 1,…,n immigrants entering The Netherlands
in our observation window. We have the indicators Δi denoting that
the migration spell is uncensored. Thus the likelihood contribution of
migrant i conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity v is,
L ¼ ∏
n
i¼1
Z (
θ tijx tið Þ; vð ÞΔiexp −
Z ti
0
θ τjx τð Þ; vð Þ dτ
   1−aikð Þ
 exp −
Z t1i
0
θ τjx τð Þ; vð Þdτ
 !
−exp −
Z tai
0
θ τjx τð Þ; vÞdτð Þ
 " #ai)
dG vð Þ
ð2Þ
where we assume that the unobserved heterogeneity follows a discrete
distribution with three points of support, v1,v2,v3 and Pr(V= v1) = p1,
Pr(V= v2) = p2, Pr(V= v3) = 1− p1–p2.1
4.1. Results of simple duration model
We assume a piecewise constant baseline intensity on seven inter-
vals (at three and six months and at one, two, three and ﬁve years and
beyond ﬁve years). The covariates included in themodel refer to demo-
graphics (gender, age, marital status and age of children), country of
origin's GDPper capita andGDPgrowth rate, and individual labormarket
characteristics (monthly income and industry sector). The individual's
labor market history is also included.
We control for business cycle conditions by including the national
unemployment rate, both at the moment of ﬁrst entry to the country1 We estimate v1= exp(a1), v2= exp(a2), v3= exp(a3) and (q1, q2) with p1= eq1/(1+
eq1 + eq2) and p2 = eq2/(1 + eq1 + eq2).and the time-varying monthly rate. The unemployment rate at entry
captures the ‘cohort effect’ ofmigrants,while the current varying unem-
ployment rate captures the impact of the business cycle on the intensity
to leave.
Table 2 presents the results for a proportional hazard model and a
mixed proportional hazardmodel.We discuss themost relevant results.
The income of migrants in The Netherlands has a U-shaped effect on
the intensity to leave as both immigrants with low and high income
leave faster. It is interesting to note that those with the lowest income
(less than 1000) have the highest probability of leaving.
Self-employed migrants have a stronger attachment to The
Netherlands. Self-employment may imply a risky investment, which
increases the ties to the country. It seems that those migrants are rather
good in setting up a new business. House owners are, not surprisingly,
less prone to leave. More migration experience makes the migrants
more mobile internationally, see DaVanzo (1983).
Home country conditions seem to play an important role in return.
Immigrants from a poorer country of origin are less likely to leave, yet
positive economic growth at home triggers return migration. High
national unemployment rates, however, do lead to an increase in the
departure of labor migrants. From the baseline duration dependence,
we can conclude that the intensity to leave is low for the ﬁrst three
months in the country, then increases to a high for two years and then
slowly decreases.
Those non-participating and having no income are more likely to
leave but those unemployed on beneﬁts are less prone to return.
These estimates should be interpreted with care as changes in the
labor market status might be correlated with migration moves. If such
selectivity exists it will bias the estimates of the effect of labor market
changes on the migration intensity. Bijwaard et al. (forthcoming)
address this issue to obtain the causal effects of labor market changes
on the return migration intensity by using a ‘timing-of-events’method.
In this paper the focus is on the impact of income, which depends on
the labor market status, on the return migration intensity and not on
the labor market changes itself. We therefore proceed with a method
that takes this selectivity and the endogeneity of earned income into
account.α7 (N60 months) 2.399⁎⁎⁎ (0.106) 2.727⁎⁎⁎ (0.123)
Age, sector, entry year and country dummies are also included in the estimation.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
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Our interest in this paper is to examine whether high- or low-
income migrants return faster whilst controlling for the endogeneity
of the labormarket status and earned income, which impacts the return
migration process.We are interested, per se, in the labormarket and the
migration dynamics, the timing of the transitions and the time between
transitions. Since we observe immigrants from the time they enter to
the time they leave or till the end of our observation window, and
since we focus on those employed immigrants at entry (after
3 months), an immigrant potentially faces different risks of exiting
his/her ﬁrst state of employment and multiple durations. Hence we
use a competing risks model where there are several exit states. We
deﬁne four states as follows:
1. Employed in the host country;
2. Unemployed and receiving beneﬁts in the host country;
3. Out of the labormarket (includes both unemployed but not receiving
beneﬁts and non labor marker participants) in the host country;
4. Living abroad (left the host country; i.e., returned).
These states aremutually exclusive and exhaust all possible destina-
tions. Amigrantmay leave a state j= 1,…,3 (we ignore repeated immi-
gration) for any of the other destination states, i.e. for j = 1 the
destination states are k = 2,3,4, for j = 2 k = 1,3,4 etc. We view the
migrant behavior as a semi-Markov process with individuals moving
between the ﬁrst three states and abroad as an absorbing state.
We use a competing risks model hazard model for each origin–
destination pair. We deﬁne the random variables Tjk that describe the
time since entry in j for a transition from j to k. We assume amixed pro-
portional hazard model for which the intensity for the transition from j
to k is:
λjk tjXjk tð Þ;Vjk
 
¼ λ0jk tð Þexp β′jkXjk tð Þ þ Vjk
 
ð3Þ
where Xjk tð Þ ¼ Xjk sð Þj0≤s≤t
n o
is the sample path of the observed
characteristics up to time t, which is, without loss of generality, assumed
to be left continuous. The unobserved heterogeneity Vjk also enters the
intensity multiplicatively. We assume that the path of the observed
characteristics is independent of the unobserved heterogeneity. The
positive function λ0jk(t) is the baseline intensity and we assume that it
is piecewise constant on H intervals,2 i.e. λ0jk tð Þ ¼∑Hh¼1 eαjkh Ih tð Þ with
Ih(t) = I(th − 1 ≤ t ≤ th) and t0 = 0, tH = ∞. Any duration dependence
can be approximated arbitrarily closely by increasing the number of
intervals. The integrated intensity for a transition from j to k at duration
t is (conditional on V)
Λ jk tjXjk tð Þ;Vjk
 
¼
XH
h¼1
eαjkhþβjkXhþVjk th−th−1ð Þ Jh tð Þ
þ
XH
h¼1
eαjkhþβjkXhþVjk t−th−1ð ÞIh tð Þ
ð4Þ
with Jh(t)= I(t N th) andwe assume that any change in the time-varying
components of X only occurs at discrete times and that the H intervals
also capture these changes. Thus, xh is the value of x in interval [th − 1,
th]. For identiﬁcation we assume the baseline hazard is one in the ﬁrst
interval, i.e. αjk1 = 0.
For each origin state, only the smallest of T˜jk durations Tj =minkTjk
and the corresponding actual transition destination are observed. The
other durations are censored, in the sense that all is known that their2 It is not necessary that each baseline intensity changes at the same durations.
Here H is the total number of intervals considered. If, for the transition from j to k,
the baseline intensity remains the same in Ih(t) and Ih + 1(t), we have ajkh = ajkh + 1.realizations exceed T˜j. If for individual i we observeMijk j to k transition
spells, at sojourn times t1,…,tM, then the likelihood contribution of
theseMijk transitions is:
Ljk Vð Þ ¼ ∏
Mijk
m¼1
λjk tmjXjk tmð Þ;Vjk
 δmjkexp−X
g≠ j
Λ jg tmjXjg tmð Þ;Vjg
 
ð5Þ
where δmjk = 1 for a j to k transition and 0 otherwise, Λ jk
tmjXjk tmð Þ;Vjk
 
¼ ∫tm
0
λjk sjXjk sð Þ;Vjk
 
ds, the integrated intensity.
The income of amigrant depends on the labormarket status,with by
deﬁnition zero income in the non participation state, and the time
spend t in this state
lnW tð Þ ¼ ξ0 þ
XH
h¼1
ξhIh tð Þ þ ξxx tð Þ þ ϵ tð Þ ð6Þ
where, for a given migrant, the error term is composed of two compo-
nents, an independently normally distributed idiosyncratic component
and a random individual-speciﬁc component
ϵ tð Þ ¼ η tð Þ þ vw
The likelihood contribution from a sequence of income observations
over an employment spell is thus
Lw

W 1ð Þ;…;W tð Þjx 1ð Þ;…; x tð Þ; vw

¼ ∏
s≤ t
ϕ
lnW sð Þ−ξ0−
XH
h¼1 ξhIh sð Þ−ξxx sð Þ−vw
ση
0@ 1A
ð7Þ
with ση being the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component
and ϕ(∙) the standard normal probability density function.
For the sake of parsimoniousness, we assume that each of the unob-
served heterogeneity terms remains the same for recurrent durations of
the same type, and we adopt a discrete distribution, i.e. V has discrete
support (V1,…,VM) and pm = Pr(V= Vm).3 It is important to note that
the Vms are vectors with Vm = (V12m,V13m,V14m,V21m,V23m,V24m,V31m,
V32m,V34m,Vwm)′ including all the possible transitions and the random
components of the income equations.
The complete likelihood function for each individual is
L ¼ ∫Lw jVð Þ ∏
j¼e;u;n
∏
k≠ j
Ljk Vð Þ dHjk Vjk
 
ð8Þ
Hjk(Vjk) is the distribution function of the unobserved heterogeneity.
5.1. Results of the competing risks model
The number of vectors of support is chosen to be M = 3. Table 3
presents the estimated income coefﬁcients of all the transitions
involved. 4 However, the interpretation of the coefﬁcients in a com-
peting risks model requires caution.5 A particular covariate, say xl,
can appear in several intensities. In such a case the vectors βljk
convey little information about the effect of the covariate on the
probability to exit from origin j to destination k. The reason is that3 To assure that the probability is between zero and one we estimate qm with pm ¼
eqm = 1þ∑eq jð Þ.
4 The full tables of estimated coefﬁcients are available from the authors upon request.
5 Note that in a standardmixed proportional hazard (MPH)model, the interpretation of
the coefﬁcients is also not straightforward. In anMPHmodel, the regression coefﬁcient of
covariate xl is only deﬁned conditionally on the unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 3
Income coefﬁcient estimates for correlated competing risks model.
CCRM exogenous income CCRM-endogenous income
From employed From employed
Unemployed NPa Abroad Unemployed NPa Abroad
Income 0–1000 1.211⁎⁎⁎ 1.036⁎⁎⁎ 0.919⁎⁎⁎ 1.027⁎⁎⁎ 0.750⁎⁎⁎ 0.834⁎⁎⁎
(0.095) (0.040) (0.071) (0.100) (0.041) (0.074)
Income 1000–2000 0.190⁎⁎ 0.340⁎⁎⁎ −0.206⁎⁎⁎ 0.132 0.239⁎⁎⁎ −0.219⁎⁎⁎
(0.083) (0.032) (0.054) (0.083) (0.032) (0.054)
Income 2000–3000 – – – – – –
Income 3000–4000 −0.204 −0.062 0.277⁎⁎⁎ −0.164 −0.009 0.268⁎⁎⁎
(0.141) (0.046) (0.058) (0.141) (0.045) (0.057)
Income 4000–5000 −0.452⁎⁎ 0.020 0.468⁎⁎⁎ −0.406+ 0.091 0.450⁎⁎⁎
(0.226) (0.059) (0.071) (0.226) (00.057) (0.069)
Income 5000–6000 −0.224 0.053 0.544⁎⁎⁎ −0.175 0.118+ 0.525⁎⁎⁎
(0.262) (0.072) (0.087) (0.268) (0.070) (0.084)
Income N 6000 −0.532⁎⁎ 0.070 0.781⁎⁎⁎ −0.456⁎⁎ 0.170⁎⁎⁎ 0.762⁎⁎⁎
(0.206) (0.049) (0.062) (0.206) (0.071) (0.060)
From unemployed From unemployed
Employed NPa Abroad Employed NPa Abroad
Income b 1000 −0.167⁎⁎ −0.303⁎⁎⁎ −0.698⁎⁎⁎ −0.139⁎⁎ −0.367⁎⁎⁎ −0.801⁎⁎⁎
(0.072) (0.090) (0.226) (0.068) (0.084) (0.225)
Income N 1000 – – – – – –
Income coefﬁcients from non-participation are absent because all migrants in non-participation has zero income.
+ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
a Non-participating.
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a transition to k but also on the transition intensities to all other
states.
For this reason we only mention the main ﬁnding of the income
effect on the transition intensities.6We present the return intensities
for both endogenous and exogenous income in order to compare
those results to those of the simple model. First, it is important
to note that in both cases, when a migrant is employed, income
has a U-shaped effect on return migration (transition to abroad),
reﬂecting what we have found for the simple duration model. The
transition to unemployment is negatively related to the income
while employed, and the income effect of the transition to non-
participation is U-shaped. Thus, even when income is endogenous,
we still ﬁnd this U-shaped effect. However, migrants can leave the
country after some period of unemployment/non-participation,
or after more intermediate states. The multi-state competing risk
framework takes this into account, but makes the interpretation of
the coefﬁcients difﬁcult.
5.2. Transition probability in multi-state models
The difﬁculty in interpreting the covariate effects also arises inmany
other non-linear models, such as the multinomial logit and probit
models (see e.g. Cameron and Trivedi (2005), chapter 15). The results
of such models are, therefore, usually reported in terms of themarginal
effects on the probability of interest. Thomas (1996) and Kyyrä (2009)
argue that a similar practice is useful in the context of competing risks
models. Although the marginal effects eliminate much of the confusion
in the interpretation of the results from competing risks models,
they have rarely been computed. A drawback is that in general the
marginal effects have no analytical solution, making their computation6 Appendix A reports the estimated correlation structure of unobserved heterogeneity
across transition probabilities and shows the difference in predictions of the simple dura-
tion model and the competing risks model.demanding and statistical inference difﬁcult. Kyyrä (2009) shows that
simple closed form solutions exist for the competing risks models
with piecewise constant baseline hazards and discrete unobserved het-
erogeneity, exactly the model formulation we assume.
To look further ahead, we need to take all the transitions into ac-
count. In a multi-state model, migrants can return to the state they
were once before. An employed migrant may, as we observe in our
data, ﬁrst become a non-participant before he leaves the country.
Another possible route to leave the country is through unemploy-
ment and non-participation. It is even possible that the migrant,
after a period of unemployment, returns to work and then leaves
the country. The transition probability, which is the probability to
be in a particular state given the time since entry, takes all the possi-
ble intermediate transitions into account. Dabrowska et al. (1994)
describe how we can derive these transition probabilities for the
semi-Markov model we use.
The transition probability from state j to state k after a duration t
(where t is now the time since the migrant entered the host) is
formed by adding all possible intermediate transitions that start
in j and end in k at time t. First consider the migrants who do not
make a transition in (0,t), thus j = k. Those individuals remain in j
till t, they are the migrants who remain working. The probability
that the employed remain working is equal to the total survival of
the employed, Sj(t), i.e.
Sj tjXjk tð Þ
 
¼ Pr eT j≥t  ¼ ∏
l≠ j
∫exp −Λ jl tjXjl tð Þ;VjkÞ
 
dGjl Vjl
 
:

ð9Þ
Nextwe have themigrants whomake one transitionwithin a period
t since they entered the country, say from employment to non-
participation, and then remain in this state till the end of the period.
The probability that a transition from j to k before t occurs and the
migrants then remain in k is equal to
Z t
0
f jk ujð Þ  Sk t−uð Þ du
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Fig. 3. Probability of return with 95% conﬁdence bands (reference individual).
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tional on unobserved heterogeneity the cumulative incidence can
be expressed as
Fjk tjXjk tð Þ;Vjk
 
¼ Pr T j≤t;destination : k
 
¼
Z t
0
λjk sjXjk sð Þ;Vjk
 
Sj sjXjk sð Þ;Vjk
 
ds
¼
XH
h¼1
πhjk Xð jVjkÞ
h
S th−1jXjl tð Þ;Vjk
 
− S thjXjl tð Þ;Vjk
 i
Jh tð Þ
þ
XH
h¼1
πhjk XjVjk
 h
S th−1jXjl tð Þ;Vjk
 
− S tjXjl tð Þ;Vjk
 i
Ih tð Þ
ð10Þ
where πjkh (X|Vjk) denotes the probability of exit from j to k in
interval [th − 1,th) conditional on exiting and S(th − 1|∙) − S(th|∙) is
the probability of exiting j during the interval [th − 1,th). Integrating
the correlated (over 9.M) discrete unobserved heterogeneity we
obtain
Fjk tjXjk tð Þ
 
¼
X
q
Pr V j ¼ Vqj
 
Fjk tjXjk tð Þ;Vqj
 
ð11Þ
with Vj = {Vjk,k≠ j} and the sum is over all possible realizations of
Vj (27 in our application with a 3-point discrete unobserved hetero-
geneity distribution and three exit states).
Some migrants may, after ﬁrst making a transition from employ-
ment to non-participation, end up abroad. The probability of making
a transition from j to k within a period t with one intermediate initial
transition is
F 2ð Þjk tjð Þ ¼
Z t
0
X4
m¼1
Fjm ujð Þ  f mk t−ujð Þ du7 The cumulative incidence function is also known under the name ‘subdistribution
function’. This name reﬂects that the cumulative probability to make the j–k transition re-
mains below one, Fjk(∞|∙) b 1. Note that∑ k ≠ j Fjk(t|⋅) = 1− Sj(t|⋅).with the cumulative incidence from j to j, Fjj(t∣∙)=0. Then, the probabil-
ity that a migrant who made these two transitions and who remains in
state k till t isZ t
0
f 2ð Þjk ujð ÞSk t−uð Þdu;
with fjk(2)(u|⋅)= ∂Fjk(2)(t)/∂t. This reasoning is repeated for any number
of intermediate transitions from state j to state k Thus, the transition
probability, i.e. the probability to be in k starting in j after a duration t is
Pjk tjð Þ ¼ Sj tjð Þ  I j ¼ kð Þ þ
X
p≥1
Z t
0
f pð Þjk ujð ÞSk t−uð Þ du ð12Þ
where fjk(p)(t) = ∂Fjk(p)(t)/∂t and
F pð Þjk tjð Þ ¼
Z t
0
X4
m¼1
F p−1ð Þjm ujð Þ  f mk t−ujð Þ du:
In this paper, we use data on labor migrants only and are interest-
ed in return migration. By deﬁnition, all labor immigrants to The
Netherlands are employed at entry. Thus, we are only interested in
the transition probability from employment to abroad, the return
migration probability. After estimating the competing risks model
for all the possible transitions, we will derive the path of the return
migration probability for the reference individual and discuss the
impact of income differences on this probability.
5.3. Comparing results with simple duration model
Note that for a simple (one state) duration model, the return migra-
tion probability is the cumulative density function, the probability to
experience the event after a duration t. We calculate for both the simple
and the correlated competing riskmodel (CCRM), with andwithout en-
dogenous wage, the return migration probability for the recent labor
migrants (from employed). Fig. 3 presents these return migration
probabilities for the reference migrant, a single male aged 30 to 35,
employed in the trade sector from a country with a GDP per capita of
$2000 who entered The Netherlands in 2001 and lives in a rental
house. Note that both the simple and the CCRMwith exogenous income
model underestimate the return migration of the migrants. Five years
after their arrival 62% (50% for the CCRM with exogenous wage and
33% for the simple model) of the labor migrants have left the country.
62 G.E. Bijwaard, J. Wahba / Journal of Development Economics 108 (2014) 54–68After ten years the percentage ofmigrants that have left the country has
increased to 83% (71% for the CCRM with exogenous wage and 55% ac-
cording to the simple model). Hence, those results underscore the im-
portance of taking into account the endogeneity of wages on return
intensities.
Fig. 4 presents the marginal (as a function of the time since entry)
effect of initial income on the return migration probability for the
CCRM model with and without endogenous wage and for the simple
model. First we observe that the simple model and the exogenous
wage model overestimate the long run income effects on the return
migration probability. When taking labor market changes into account,
low-income migrants have a 9% higher probability to leave (this differ-
ence remains rather constant after ﬁve years since entry). Low-incomeMonths since entry
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Fig. 4.Marginal effect of inmigrants have a much higher probability of becoming unemployed
or non-participating and migrants are more prone to leave when not
employed. The simple model does not take this relation between the
labor market status and migrant income into account.
Indeed, Table 4 summarizes the marginal effects of initial income
on return probability by duration in The Netherlands based on the
endogenous wage case. The U-shaped relationship between initial
income and return is clear and also the lowest earners have the highest
probability of return among all income groups regardless of theirmigra-
tion duration. There is evidence of failure leading to return migration as
those with the lowest income have the highest probability for the ﬁrst
year, and about 30% more likelihood, to return compared with the
next likely group (the top earners). In addition, the probabilities ofPe
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itial income on return.
Table 4
Marginal income effect on return probability by duration in NL.
Initial income: from low to high
Inc 1 Inc 2 Inc 3 Inc 4 Inc 5 Inc 6 Inc 7
1 year 0.0378⁎⁎⁎ −0.0239⁎⁎⁎ – 0.0159 0.0198+ 0.0224+ 0.0253⁎⁎
2 year 0.0820⁎⁎⁎ −0.0624⁎⁎⁎ – 0.0424 0.0496+ 0.0440 0.0489+
3 year 0.0930⁎⁎⁎ −0.0903⁎⁎⁎ – 0.0556 0.0571 0.0573 0.0568+
4 year 0.0964⁎⁎⁎ −0.1080⁎⁎⁎ – 0.0601 0.0644+ 0.0585 0.0614
5 year 0.0916⁎⁎⁎ −0.1136⁎⁎⁎ – 0.0622 0.0655+ 0.0600 0.0594
6 year 0.0916⁎⁎⁎ −0.1107⁎⁎⁎ – 0.0618 0.0645+ 0.0616+ 0.0610+
7 year 0.0875⁎⁎⁎ −0.1121⁎⁎⁎ – 0.0587+ 0.0620+ 0.0577 0.0571
8 year 0.0841⁎⁎⁎ −0.1103⁎⁎⁎ – 0.0560+ 0.0582+ 0.0530 0.0532
9 year 0.0797⁎⁎⁎ −0.1044⁎⁎⁎ – 0.0569+ 0.0570+ 0.0518+ 0.0527+
10 year 0.0714⁎⁎⁎ −0.1018⁎⁎⁎ – 0.0505+ 0.0518+ 0.0490+ 0.0484+
Inc 1:Monthly income b €1000; Inc 2:Monthly income €1000–€2000; Inc 3:Monthly income €2000–€3000; Inc 4:Monthly income €3000–€4000; Inc 5:Monthly income €4000–€5000;
Inc 6: Monthly income €5000–€6000; Inc 7: Monthly income N €6000.
+ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
Table 5
Simulation results for 10 years.
Initial income: from low to high
Inc 1 Inc 2 Inc 3 Inc 4 Inc 5 Inc 6 Inc 7
Average time in NL 47.2 67.4 56.7 50.7 50.4 50.8 50.6
Fraction of time in NL employed 65.8% 79.6% 78.4% 77.7% 78.0% 78.0% 77.9%
Fraction of time in NL unemployed 6.3% 3.4% 3.3% 2.3% 2.1% 2.3% 2.2%
Fraction of time in NL no income 27.9% 17.0% 18.3% 20.0% 19.9% 19.8% 19.9%
Fraction unemployed within 10 years 15.7% 12.3% 10.0% 8.6% 8.2% 8.5% 8.3%
Fraction no-income within 10 years 69.5% 65.7% 58.9% 56.6% 56.0% 56.5% 56.3%
Average # of employment spells 1.52 1.38 1.32 1.28 1.27 1.28 1.28
Average spell length if employed 20.4 38.7 33.8 30.8 30.9 30.9 30.9
Average # of unemployment spells 0.42 0.25 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.15
Average spell length if unemployed 7.2 9.3 10.2 7.6 7.4 7.7 7.5
Average # of no income spells 0.84 0.73 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
Average spell length if no income 15.7 17.0 16.1 16.3 16.2 16.1 16.2
Inc 1:Monthly income b €1000; Inc 2:Monthly income €1000–€2000; Inc 3:Monthly income 2000–3000; Inc 4:Monthly income €3000–€4000; Inc 5:Monthly income €4000–€5000; Inc
6: Monthly income €5000–€6000; Inc 7: Monthly income N €6000.
Table 6
Labor market paths.
Initial income: from low to high
Inc 1 Inc 2 Inc 3 Inc 4 Inc 5 Inc 6 Inc 7
Most common paths
% Employed for 10 years 0.3% 7.3% 3.6% 2.3% 2.3% 2.4% 2.5%
% Employed-abroad 26.9% 24.2% 35.5% 39.8% 40.4% 39.7% 39.9%
Average employment duration 23.6 35.6 32.4 30.2 29.8 29.9 29.7
% Employed–NP-abroad 40.6% 36.8% 33.6% 33.0% 32.8% 32.8% 32.8%
Average employment duration 17.5 28.6 25.8 23.7 23.9 23.8 23.6
Average no income duration 20.4 19.4 19.7 20.0 20.1 20.0 20.2
% Employed–NP-employed 2.5% 8.4% 5.5% 3.8% 4.0% 4.1% 4.1%
Average 1st employment duration 28.4 39.2 36.8 34.5 36.3 35.1 37.1
Average no income duration 14.0 10.1 11.3 11.9 11.9 12.1 11.1
Average 2nd employment duration 78.6 71.7 72.9 74.6 72.8 73.8 72.8
%Emp–NP–emp-abroad 10.0% 5.9% 7.9% 9.1% 9.0% 9.1% 9.0%
Average 1st employment duration 16.5 24.1 22.4 20.9 20.9 20.9 21.4
Average 1st no income duration 8.0 7.6 7.8 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.8
Average 2nd employment duration 31.9 37.2 35.0 34.7 33.8 34.9 33.4
Most common paths ending abroada
%Employed-abroad 29.8% 33.2% 42.7% 45.1% 45.7% 45.1% 45.4%
%Employed–NP-abroad 45.0% 50.5% 40.5% 37.5% 37.2% 37.3% 37.3%
%Emp–NP–emp-abroad 11.0% 8.0% 9.5% 10.4% 10.2% 10.3% 10.3%
%Emp–unemp–emp-abroad 1.9% 1.1% 1.3% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 0.8%
Inc 1:Monthly income b €1000; Inc 2:Monthly income €1000–€2000; Inc 3:Monthly income €2000–€3000; Inc 4:Monthly income €3000–€4000; Inc 5:Monthly income €4000–€5000;
Inc 6: Monthly income €5000–€6000; Inc 7: Monthly income N €6000.
a Percentage of all paths ending abroad.
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Table 7
Descriptive statistics at entry: LDC labor migrants.
Country of origin
India Turkey China South Africa Morocco
Female 11.4% 17.3% 19.6% 28.9% 20.7%
Single 73.6% 68.9% 63.8% 64.3% 64.0%
Married 26.3% 29.9% 35.5% 34.5% 33.1%
Av. age 29.0 31.9 30.5 31.6 32.4
GDP pc. $787 $5228 $1866 $3722 $1524
GDP growth 8.4% 4.2% 11.6% 3.9% 4.0%
Income distribution
b€1000 20.6% 33.1% 42.5% 21.7% 56.5%
€1000–€2000 17.5% 27.2% 35.2% 20.6% 25.4%
€2000–€3000 25.1% 24.5% 10.7% 21.5% 9.6%
€3000–€4000 17.5% 7.1% 4.3% 13.1% 3.5%
€4000–€5000 8.9% 2.9% 2.1% 6.6% 1.2%
€5000–€6000 3.0% 1.2% 1.5% 3.9% 0.2%
N€6000 7.5% 4.1% 3.8% 12.6% 3.7%
N= 3261 1851 1726 1309 492
% 18.7% 10.6% 9.9% 7.5% 2.8%
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the other income groups peaks a bit later at about 4–6 years. The gap
in the intensity of return between the lowest- and highest-income
group does not decline over time. Althoughwe still ﬁnd a U relationship
between initial income and return intensity, there is no signiﬁcant
difference among the high income groups, earning above the average
income, income groups 4–7.6. Microsimulation
The return migration probability gives the probability that a labor
migrant is abroad after a given time since themigrant entered the coun-
try. It takes the full dynamics into account. However, this transition
probability hides the information on how an individual reached a
certain state. Many relevant indicators of the paths of the immigrants
on the host labor market, e.g. the average length of an unemployment
spell, cannot be derived analytically. In this section we provide these
indicators on the basis of microsimulations. These simulations use the
estimated parameters of the correlated competing risks model and the
observed entry into The Netherlands as input.
This simulation is based on a synthetic cohort of labor migrants,
all entering at the same time. The synthetic cohort consists of 50,000
migrants, for which the distribution of the start population of migrantsPe
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Fig. 5. Probability of return by main counequals the observed entry distribution. For each simulation round,
we draw a vector of parameter estimates assuming that the estimated
coefﬁcients are normally distributed around the point estimates with
a variance–covariance matrix equal to the estimated one. Then, on a
monthly basis, we simulate the transitions for each member of the
synthetic cohort using the implied transition intensities. If the simulated
migrant becomes unemployed, we use the transition intensity from
unemployment, and similarly for a non-participating migrant and a
migrant abroad. In the simulations the exogenous explanatory factors
remain at their initial value. The (endogenous) value of the income of
the migrant increases over the length of the time spent in employment
using the implied income increase obtained from the estimated ccrm.
We use the evolution of the labor–migration path, the history of all
occurrences of labor market and migration states, of each individual
member in the (dynamic) simulation. Thus, if a (simulated) migrant
ﬁnds a job again after some period of unemployment, we take the effect
of the labor market experience into account. We simulate the labor–
migration path for ten years, and in the endwe save thewhole simulat-
ed migrant history. We repeat the simulations 100 times.
Table 5 presents some labor market and migration indicators and
Table 6 presents the average paths of the migrants on the labor market.
Both these simulation results are differentiated by initial income level.
It is obvious that the low income migrants spend more time unem-
ployed and non-participating and less time employed. The distinction
between the high income groups levels off, though the difference
between the lowest, middle and high groups is still apparent. Almost
16% of the lowest-income migrants have been unemployed within
ten years of arrival. When they become unemployed they are unem-
ployed for slightly more than half a year. However, the migrants in the
lowest-income group also stay less than a little over one year in the
country. Still, more than 8% of the high-income groups (groups 4–7)
have been unemployed within ten years in The Netherlands and stay
on average unemployed for 7.5 months. More than half of themigrants
experience a periodwith no income (70% for the lowest-income group).
On average they are without income for about one year and four
months. From Table 6 we can derive that themajority of these migrants
without income remain in the country after their job has ﬁnished, as
37% to 51% of the labor migrants returning after ﬁrst experiencing a
period of no income. Another interesting fact from Table 6 is that only
a small portion of themigrants remains employed for the full (simulated)
ten-year period. For the lowest-income group only 0.3% of the migrants
remain employed for the whole ten years. The lower-income groups
leave the country more often after one (or more) labor market changes.
Interestingly, the most common path for the lowest-income group is since entry
60 66 72 78 84 90 96 102 108 114 120
try of origin (reference individual).
65G.E. Bijwaard, J. Wahba / Journal of Development Economics 108 (2014) 54–68non-participation before return (45%), whilst for the highest-income
groups is leaving straight from employment (45%).
7. Speciﬁc countries
7.1. Descriptive statistics
Given the potential variation between countries of origin, we focus
here on ﬁve main countries of labor immigration to The Netherlands,
namely India, Turkey, China, South Africa and Morocco. As seen in
Table 7, almost 19% of recent labor immigrants came from India
and 10% from China. Labor immigrants from Turkey represented 11%
and those from Morocco were only 3% as the majority of immigrants
from these two countries tend be family migrants rather thanPe
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Fig. 6.Marginal effect of initial inlabor immigrants. Finally, 8% of immigrants came from South Africa.
The distribution of income group shows that labor migrants from
Morocco and China more often start with low paying jobs, while Indian
and South African migrants are overrepresented in high-paying jobs.
South African migrants are more often female, due to a Dutch policy to
attract nurses from that country, while only a few Indian migrants are
female. Indian labor migrants are also younger and more often single.
Given the small proportion of our immigrants earning above 3000, we
aggregate the high income groups together in the analysis below.
7.2. Transition probability in multistate models
Fig. 5, which is based on the estimated competing risks model,
shows the probability of return by duration of migration. Indians andPe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
income < 1000
income 1000−2000
income > 3000
Turkey
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
income < 1000
income 1000−2000
income > 3000
South-Africa
income < 1000
income 1000−2000
income > 3000
−
0.
15
−
0.
12
−
0.
09
−
0.
06
−
0.
03
0.
00
0.
03
0.
06
0.
09
−
0.
15
−
0.
12
−
0.
09
−
0.
06
−
0.
03
0.
00
0.
03
0.
06
0.
09
cco
Months since entry
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 66 72 78 84 90 96 102 108 114 120
ce entry
66 72 78 84 90 96 102 108 114 120
Months since entry
0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 66 72 78 84 90 96 102 108 114 120
come on return, by country.
India
Turkey
China
SA
Morocco
after 2 years in NL
India
Turkey
China
SA
Morocco
inc < 1000 inc 1000−2000 inc 2000−3000 inc > 3000
inc < 1000 inc 1000−2000 inc 2000−3000 inc > 3000
−
0.
15
−
0.
10
−
0.
05
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
−
0.
15
−
0.
10
−
0.
05
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
after 8 years in NL
Fig. 7.Marginal effect of initial income on the probability abroad.
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and South Africans exhibit the lowest return (Fig. 6) reveals that immi-
grants from India and China have, after controlling for labor market and
earned income changes, the strongest income effect on return after two
years, but after six years in The Netherlands, South Africans and
Moroccans have the highest income effects.
In accordance with our results from Section 5.3, for each of our
countries of origin we ﬁnd consistently a U-shaped relationship
between initial income and return, Fig. 7, and that the lowest income
group has the highest probability of return followed by the top earners
whilst middle income groups have lower return probabilities. Although
a U pattern is found for immigrants from each country, there is a varia-
tion in the impact of income on return among countries.
A similar simulation as in Section 6 was carried out for each of
the ﬁve countries separately (Table 8). These simulation results also in-
dicate the variations in the labor market path among immigrants from
different countries controlling for their income group. For example,
among the lowest-income group, 7% of Indians experience unemploy-
ment within 10 years in The Netherlands compared with 21% among
Moroccans. On the other hand, looking at all Indian (Moroccans) immi-
grants, Table 8 shows that those with initially less than 1000 stay on av-
erage 29 (50) months in The Netherlands, whilst the high earners stay
31 (54) months.
8. Conclusion
The impact of income earned overseas is theoretically ambigu-
ous with regard to return migration. Migrants would, on the onehand, like to extend their stay overseas as a response to higher
wages; on the other hand, the gain from staying longer abroad
decreases. As a consequence, higher wages abroad may have a
positive or a negative effect on migration duration. In this paper,
we estimate the impact of income earned in the host country on re-
turn migration of labor migrants. We use a four state correlated
competing risks model to account for the strong dependence of
the migrant's labor market status and earned income. In addition,
we control for the changes in country of origin's economic growth
and GDP per capita. For the analysis we use unique administra-
tive panel data of recent labor immigrants from LDCs to The
Netherlands.
The empirical results reveal that return intensities are U-shaped
with respect to initial income with high intensity for low- and high-
income groups and the lowest-income group exhibiting the highest
return. We also ﬁnd that ignoring the interdependence of labor market
status and in particular, income earned leads to overestimating the
long run impact of initial income differences on return. The fact
that low income migrants return faster can be interpreted as a result
of failure. On the other hand, high earners leaving is due to them
successfully meeting their target savings or acquiring their planned
skills. Also, taking into account the endogeneity of earned income
dampens the effect of income on departure for high earners who
are more likely to have a higher risk attitude which induces more
wage growth and higher mobility. Overall, our results show that
although the intensity of return varies by duration and country of
origin, the U-shaped relationship between initial income and return
is consistently found.
Table 8
Simulation results for 10 years, main LDC countries of origin.
Country of origin
India Turkey China South Africa Morocco
Initial monthly income b €1000
Average time in NL 29.3 41.9 33.5 50.5 50.4
Fraction of time in NL employed 78.5% 66.5% 77.5% 70.2% 65.4%
Fraction of time in NL unemployed 5.3% 8.3% 6.2% 8.7% 14.0%
Fraction of time in NL no income 16.1% 25.2% 16.3% 21.1% 20.6%
Fraction unemployed within 10 years 7.1% 12.8% 8.5% 15.9% 23.0%
Fraction no-income within 10 years 42.1% 65.5% 41.9% 61.5% 67.5%
Initial monthly income at entry €1000–€2000
Average time in NL 47.0 59.0 52.4 69.4 69.5
Fraction of time in NL employed 88.8% 80.5% 87.9% 83.0% 80.7%
Fraction of time in NL unemployed 2.3% 4.2% 2.8% 4.3% 6.8%
Fraction of time in NL no income 8.9% 15.3% 9.3% 12.7% 12.4%
Fraction unemployed within 10 years 5.3% 10.0% 6.5% 11.6% 16.7%
Fraction no-income within 10 years 39.4% 60.4% 39.0% 55.6% 62.3%
Initial monthly income €2000–€3000
Average time in NL 35.8 49.7 41.2 59.6 59.3
Fraction of time in NL employed 87.7% 79.5% 87.1% 82.4% 79.9%
Fraction of time in NL unemployed 2.3% 3.9% 2.8% 3.7% 6.6%
Fraction of time in NL no income 10.0% 16.5% 10.1% 13.9% 13.5%
Fraction unemployed within 10 years 3.7% 7.4% 4.9% 8.9% 13.2%
Fraction no-income within 10 years 33.5% 55.1% 33.2% 51.1% 57.7%
Initial monthly income at entry N€3000
Average time in NL 31.1 45.0 35.6 54.1 53.9
Fraction of time in NL employed 87.3% 79.2% 87.2% 82.5% 80.9%
Fraction of time in NL unemployed 1.6% 2.9% 2.0% 2.8% 4.7%
Fraction of time in NL no income 11.1% 17.9% 10.8% 14.7% 14.4%
Fraction unemployed within 10 years 3.0% 6.5% 4.0% 7.4% 11.1%
Fraction no-income within 10 years 31.2% 52.9% 30.9% 49.1% 55.5%
67G.E. Bijwaard, J. Wahba / Journal of Development Economics 108 (2014) 54–68Our ﬁndings have important policy immigration implications. It is
interesting to underscore that less successful immigrants return and
thus the overconcern by host countries being burdened by welfare
seekers is unfounded. Furthermore, the return of the more successful
immigrant indicates that the concern by LDCs about the brain drain is
exaggerated as migration might lead to brain circulation.Appendix A. Correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity
termsTable A.1
Correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity terms.
veu ven vea vue vun
veu –
ven 0.899⁎⁎⁎ –
vea 0.833⁎⁎⁎ 0.506 –
vue −0.724⁎⁎⁎ −0.953⁎⁎⁎ −0.221 –
vun −0.998⁎⁎⁎ −0.870⁎⁎⁎ −0.865⁎⁎⁎ 0.680⁎⁎⁎ –
vua −0.993⁎⁎⁎ −0.841⁎⁎⁎ −0.892⁎⁎⁎ 0.637⁎⁎ 0.998⁎⁎⁎
vne 0.283 −0.166⁎⁎ 0.767⁎⁎ 0.457+ −0.342⁎⁎
vnu −0.613 −0.897+ −0.073 0.989⁎⁎⁎ 0.563
vna −0.913⁎⁎⁎ −0.642⁎⁎⁎ −0.986⁎⁎⁎ 0.340 0.937⁎⁎⁎
vw −0.998⁎⁎⁎ −0.927⁎⁎⁎ 0.793⁎⁎ 0.769⁎⁎⁎ 0.991⁎⁎⁎
vua vne vnu vna vw
vua –
vne −0.394⁎⁎⁎ –
vnu 0.515 0.585 –
vna 0.955⁎⁎⁎ −0.649⁎⁎⁎ 0.238 –
vw 0.983⁎⁎⁎ −0.217⁎⁎⁎ 0.665 0.883⁎⁎⁎ –
+ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.References
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